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Unsiteability: What Should It Tell Us?
Michael Thompson*
Introduction
Lawrence Summers' World Bank memorandum' - urging that
the rich countries export their hazardous wastes to the poor countries -
is based on impeccable economic reasoning: If the winners (the rich
countries) can fully compensate the losers (the poor countries) and still
be better off than they were then that is preferable to the status quo.
This is the principle of Pareto optimality, and it is important to note
that what is crucial is that the winners can compensate the losers, not
that they do. In Summers' proposal, however, the compensations do
happen, because they are part and parcel of the market transactions
between the various nation states. "What," economists like Summers
will ask, "could be fairer than that?"
Well, we should note that this is a market solution, and that what
is seen as fair by market actors may not be seen as fair by those who
favour other solutions - the hierarchical, for instance, in which (as has
recently happened in a number of countries) governments enact and
enforce regulations to control transboundary shipments of hazardous
wastes. And those who favour what I will call the egalitarian solution,
and who wish to radically transform the production and consumption
system that is all the time generating these hazardous wastes, will see
both markets and hierarchies as inevitably perpetuating rich-poor
divides, on the one hand, and exploitative and unsustainable
technologies, on the other.
In very general terms, market actors are disposed to see as fair an
outcome in which those who have put most in get most out - a
* Dr. Thompson is Director of the Musgrave Institute, London, and Assoc. Staff
Scientist, Pacific Northwest Laboratories. He received his B.Sc. (Anthropology) from
University College London, his B.Litt. (Social Anthropology) from Oxford and his
Ph.D. from University College London.
1 Lawrence Summers, Why the Rich Should Pollute the Poor, The Guardian, Feb.
2, 1992, at 8.
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principle that is not consistent with the hierarchist's idea that
distribution should be by rank and station (that brahmins, for instance,
should have more water because they are more easily polluted than
those who are of lower caste). Nor are either of these fairness principles
compatible with the egalitarian's insistence that people should all get
exactly the same, regardless of their contribution and regardless of any
claim they may advance to priority. If policies are being designed and
implemented on the assumption that just one of these three solutions is
the right one (or even on some compromise between just two of them)
then we should not be too surprised if those who favour the excluded
solutions (or solution) scream "Unfair!" Nor should we be too surprised
if they then set about a course of action that ends up putting such
obstacles in the way of that policy that the proposed facilities become
unsiteable.
What may be surprising though is the suggestion that, in causing all
this trouble, they are actually doing those who have excluded them a
favour. The argument for this seemingly paradoxical state of affairs,
coming back to the hazardous wastes example, has to do with the harm
that rich countries may do to themselves in going along with Summers'
proposal for an international trade in "bads." The argument, at its
simplest, is that if rich countries can fairly effortlessly get rid of noxious
waste streams from their technologies, then they will never receive any
signals that would encourage them onto different and cleaner lines of
development: Lines that are better by the market criteria and by the
hierarchical and egalitarian criteria.
So what I am suggesting is that serious problems over siting some
facility should make positive contributions to the process of
technology assessment. Specifically, unsiteability should be seen as a
valuable indicator of technological inflexibility. Yet, it is not quite as
straightforward as this, because such assessment, as currently instituted,
does not address itself to the task of ensuring technological flexibility.
Another obstacle, it might be objected, is that unsiteability may
result not from the inherent properties of the technology in question
but from the institutional aspects of the siting process - serious losses
of trust by the public, for instance, that could perhaps have been
avoided (by, for instance, following the Wharton School's Facility
Siting Credo). 2 In cases such as this, it might be argued, it is only a
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matter of sorting out the institutional arrangements, and there is no
need to question the line of technological development that happens to
be embodied in the unsiteable facility. However, this argument would
be valid only if the technical and the institutional were clearly separable,
and this is never the case. Technology is always a social and cultural
process, and disentangling its technical and institutional factors, in a
way that is unanimously agreed upon by all the policy actors, is never
possible. 3 I will therefore stick to my guns and insist that
unsiteabiity, regardless of the reasons that may be advanced for it,
should always be treated as an indicator of technological inflexibility.
This, I hasten to add, is not to say that we should not try to
improve the siting process. Rather, it is an argument for constructively
relating two lines of improvement - of technology and of how to share
environmental burdens and benefits - that at present both suffer from
being carried out in isolation from one another.
Redefining Technology Assessment
Technology assessment is largely the creation of one person - U.S.
Congressman Emilio Dadario - and its aim, from the outset, has been
to anticipate the consequences of technology. Over the years, this rather
grandiose aim has been modified somewhat. The U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment, for instance, before being abolished, saw its
task more in terms of the comparative assessment of technological
options - a process that can be deemed successful even if it does not
anticipate all consequences of the technologies it compares. And more
recent institutions actually incorporate this more modest aim in their
titles. The European Parliament, for instance, is advised by an office of
Scientific and Technological Options Assessment. However, backing
off from an over-ambitious goal is not the same thing as seriously
questioning that goal and replacing it with a different one. And that, I
am arguing, is what is needed.
The trouble with the anticipation goal is that technology assessors,
at best, can only anticipate those consequences that are anticipable -
2 Howard Kunreuther, Kevin Fitzgerald & Thomas D. Aarts, Siting Noxious
Facilities: A Test of the Facility Siting Credo, 13 RiskAnal. 301 (1993).
3 See Michiel Schwarz & Michael Thompson, Divided We Stand: Redefining
Politics, Technology and Social Choice (1990).
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capable, that is, of being anticipated. No one, for instance, could have
foreseen what CFCs would do to the ozone layer, nor could the
inventors of the vacuum cleaner have anticipated that it would pretty
well rid the developed world of the human flea and its associated
diseases. It is this ineradicable shortfall between what technology
assessment aspires to and what it is capable of that is the source of what
David Collingridge calls the "control dilemma." 4 Initially, you don't
know enough about a technology, and by the time you do know
enough it's too late! At the early stages, when we still have the chance of
abandoning or profoundly altering the technology, we simply cannot
anticipate enough about it, and by the time that that information is
becoming available to us we have become irrevocably committed to the
technology and can no longer effect the required changes. Collingridge
calls this entrenchment, and it is very similar to what Brian Arthur calls
lock-in5 - Finding ourselves stuck with a particular way of doing
things (the QWERTY keyboard is a nice example) even when we are
aware of more efficient alternatives.
If you put these two notions together, and take them seriously, then
the aim of technology assessment changes from anticipation to the
avoidance of avoidable entrenchments and lock-ins. In other words, we
should stop bothering about what the consequences of individual
technologies might be and concentrate instead on ways of ensuring that
our technologies are kept as flexible as possible. To do that we need to
focus on the very early stage in a technology's life - a stage when
hardly any of its consequences are anticipable. The question
Collingridge asks is: "Is there anything that you could know at this
early stage that might tell you you are headed for serious inflexibility?"
He argues that there is, and he has developed a set of four technical
indicators of inflexibility:
* Large scale (of the production unit)
* Long lead time
* Capital intensity
* Major infrastructure needs.
4 David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (1980).
5 W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by
Historical Events: The Dynamics of Allocation Under Increasing Returns, 99
EconomicJ. 116 (1989).
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These have now been augmented by four organisational indicators
of inflexibility:
* "Single mission" outfits
* Closure to criticism
* Hype (as in "If we don't muster the political will and
invest X billion ECUs in the European Broad Band Fibre
Optic Network the Japanese will take over.")
* Hubris (as in, after Chernobyl, "It couldn't happen
here.")
I will not go into the reasoning behind these eight indicators6 -
the only requirement for an indicator is that it works - nor do I want
to argue that these indicators are perfect (they represent only the very
first steps in the effort to re-focus technology assessment). Yet, they do
work rather well when we try them out against technologies, like high-
rise systems building,7 that we have abandoned and now wish we had
never embarked on. It is to these sorts of indicators, therefore, that I
want to add the now quite common phenomenon of unsiteability.
Some Precedents
In the 1960's a large building in London - Bowater House, in
Knightsbridge - was quickly erected, thanks to some revolutionary
constructional techniques. The concrete beams at each level were post-
tensioned, i.e., they had holes through them into which were fitted
steel cables which were then tightened, ratchet-wise, so as to provide a
level of strength that could never be achieved with the conventional
steel-reinforced beam. As each floor was added, the tension of the
beams on the lower floors was increased so that they were able to bear
the progressively increasing weight of the building.
Only some months after the building was completed did it occur to
anyone to ask how it might be demolished at the end of its useful life.
There was, it turned out, no way of progressively slackening the tension
of the cables and, since no one has yet come up with a way of
demolishing a building from the-ground-floor upwards, this meant that
any attempt to take it down would result in a whole series of explosions
as each floor was propelled violently upwards once the weight above it
had been removed. The building, quite simply, was undemolishable.
6 But Collingridge, supra note 4, supplies much of that reasoning, and more is to
be found in Schwarz & Thompson, supra note 3.
7 Barry Russell, Building Systems, Industrialization and Architecture (1981).
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The authorities responded quickly to this discovery, and legislation
was soon in place requiring the designers of complex buildings to lodge
precise details of how their masterpieces were to be demolished at the
time that they submitted their applications to construct them. Thanks
to that response, the entire line of technological development, of which
Bowater House represented the first step, came to an abrupt halt, and
we have now had 30 or so years of development along a variety of other
lines, all of which provide us with buildings that can be demolished
without destroying everything else around them. My argument is that
unsiteability is like undemolishability. Once it is seen as a clear
indication that there is something seriously incomplete about the design
of the technology concerned, it becomes a valuable and positive
contribution towards long-term sustainability.
There is, for instance, a close parallel between the design of Bowater
House and the design of Britain's nuclear technology. Both are seriously
incomplete: There is no satisfactory way of demolishing the former,
and there is no satisfactory way of dealing with the unwanted and
unpleasant products of the latter. Deep, underground disposal, of
course, was supposed to be a satisfactory solution, and Britain's nuclear
establishment (itself a "single mission" outfit) set up a subsidiary "single
mission" outfit, Nirex, to carry out the job. Nirex, having identified
those areas of Britain with the ideal geological characteristics, began
exploratory drillings. Or, at least, it tried to begin exploratory
drillings.
Local resistance (including local government resistance) was so
strong that Nirex was unable to gain access, legally or physically, to the
technically suitable sites. The repository was unsiteable8 . Nirex
withdrew and, after due deliberation, announced that the ideal
geological formation was, in fact, directly below Windscale - the site
8 Something very similar happened with a bilateral forestry aid project in Nepal:
the team found itself denied access, by the local villagers, to the forest they had come
to re-plant. However, instead of going away, or calling in the army to protect them,
the team sat down with the villagers for a lengthy discussion in which each side was
able to learn about the other's idea of what a healthy forest should look like. In this
way the two visions - top-down and bottom-up - were negotiated into a socially viable
and physically possible solution that is now becoming the template for village-level
forestry throughout te reion. See Michael Thompson, Michael Warburton & Tom
HaTley, Uncertainty on a Himalayan Scale (1986); and Jack D. Ives & Bruno Messerli,
The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation (1989).
Thompson: Unsiteability 175
on which stand many of Britain's nuclear installations (including the
plutonium breeding pile that has been sealed since it caught fire in the
1950's, and the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant that is about to
start operation). This site, of course, already belongs to the organisation
that wants to dispose of the nuclear waste. Even so, it does have to
obtain planning permission for the repository. And, in view of the high
level of disbelief, not to say derision, over Nirex's claim that this is
technically the best place for the repository (it was not even on their
original list), it would be unwise to assume that the approval of their
application is a foregone conclusion 9 . Indeed the whole thing is a
ghastly mess - exactly the same sort of ghastly mess as the
undemolishable Bowater House10.
Actually, it is an even ghastlier mess, because the technology of
nuclear power is much, much more deeply entrenched than was the
post-tensioned building technology of Bowater House. But the message
is exactly the same: Abandon that line of technological development.
Such a prescription, of course, is always met with a flurry of objections
from those whose interests lie in perpetuating and deepening the
entrenchment they have already put in place: "We can't afford to
change;" "There is no alternative to change to;" "The alternatives have
incompletenesses in their designs that will turn out to be even more
intractable." This, of course, is the hierarchical line of reasoning that was
so nicely satirised by Hilaire Belloc: "Never, ever let go of nurse - For
fear of meeting something worse." And, beyond all those paternalistic
objections, there is the neoclassical economist's trump card: "If there is
a better alternative we would have found our way to it by now."
This objection, I should point out, is in a different league from the
others, because it totally dismisses my entire line of argument about
technological inflexibility and the desirability (when the signs are that
we are becoming entrenched) of switching to a different line of
technological development. In the neoclassical account of how
technology develops lock-in and entrenchment are simply not possible.
9 At the time of writing, the decision has not been made and the dispute rumbles
on over the terms of reference of the inquiry (the application having been "called in"
by The Secretary of State for the Environment).
10 Institutions and technical claims, we can see here, are so snarled up with one
another that there is no possibility of separating them in a way that will be agreed on
by all the actors in this long-running nuclear debate.
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The market encourages new technological developments and then puts
them in competition with one another. In doing that, it quickly reveals
which of the competing technologies is the most efficient and, once
that has happened, changes at the margin ensure that the most efficient
technology survives and that its less efficient rivals die out. The market,
in other words, provides the selection pressures that ensure that
technology always evolves along the most efficient path possible.
Intervening in that process, therefore, which is what my prescriptions
for lessening technological inflexibility do, can only make things less
efficient than they would have been if we had not intervened. "People,"
as they say in Chicago, "may be dumb but markets are always smart."
If the neoclassical theory is right then my argument, and the policy
prescriptions that go with it, collapse completely. So I make no
apologies for devoting the rest of this paper to showing that it is not
right; at any rate, that it is not entirely right.
Dumb People and Dumb Markets
At the empirical level the neoclassical theory is like psychoanalysis:
It is unfalsifiable. Every time a counter-example is produced, the
neoclassicists patiently explain that it has occurred because the market
has been prevented from operating properly: The hidden hand has been
prevented from doing what it would have done had it been left to its
own devices. Nuclear power, for instance, never had to raise its funds in
the money markets, nor did it have to subject itself to the disciplines of
insurance premiums and legal liabilities. The argument, therefore, has
to be carried out at the theoretical level, and this, fortunately for me,
has already been done by Brian Arthur. Arthur has shown that the
neoclassical argument holds true only in those cases where there are
decreasing returns to scale. In those situations where there are
increasing returns to scale, small historical events, far from cancelling
themselves out in the aggregate, determine the outcome1". One
consequence of this is that we can become locked into one of several
competing technologies, even though it may be less efficient than the
others. In other words, markets, as well as people, can be dumb!
1 In cases such as this, the process is "non-ergodic" and subject to a high degree of
sensitivity to initial conditions.
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This crucial distinction between the neoclassical insistence that
economic processes are insensitive to initial conditions and the reality in
which this is often not the case is depicted below. Here we see two
technologies, each nestled in its own stabilizing tough. Here, no amount
of adjustments at the margin will ever carry us away from the
undesirable technology and into the embrace of the desirable one; it
would take what ecologists call an "optimal perturbation" to carry us
over the hump that separates them.
Figure 1.
Escape from One Lock-In to a Better One.





Technology A Technology B
(more efficient) (less efficient)
Some measure of technical difference, e.g., physical scale of a compontent
Let me conclude with a topical illustration of this monstrous curve
(monstrous, that is, to the neoclassical economist). There is, at present,
an enormous amount of research funding going to what are called
clean technologies. The monstrous curve alerts us to the existence of
two very different ways of increasing technological cleanliness. The first
(what most people think of) involves scrutinising an existing technology
for points where it can be made less dirty. Loss reduction officers, for
instance, are empowered by companies that employ them to work their
way back up through the whole production process to see if any changes
can be made, here and there within it, that would reduce the quantity
and/or nastiness of the waste streams. More creative individuals (often
self-employed consultants) may look into ways of recycling those
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waste-streams (e.g., by connecting them into the feed-stocks of other
production systems) or of neutralising one nasty waste with another
nasty waste from another process. But, as well as cleaning up an existing
technology, and as well as steering it in a cleaner direction, there is
another possibility - a discontinuous jump from that particular line of
technological development to another and completely different line. It
is towards this sort of possibility that the linking of unsiteability to a
redefined technology assessment will direct our attention.
The technology of water treatment, for instance, is chemical and
biological - oxygenation, filter beds, activated sludges and so on.
Sewage treatment plants, I readily concede, do a great job but they do
end up with some nasty residues (particularly because of heavy metals).
Nor, since they do not smell very nice, are people keen to live next door
to them. Though they are not in the same league as nuclear waste
repositories or hazardous waste incinerators, sewage treatment plants are
certainly LULUs (Locally Unwanted Land Uses), and they often run
into siting difficulties. There is, however, a new water treatment
technology that is neither chemical nor biological but ecological.
This technology has been developed, over the past twenty or so
years, by John Todd and his company, Ocean Arks. It is based on what
Todd calls "living machines" - a cascade of twelve or so large plastic
barrels, each of which contains an ecosystem that has never existed in
nature. Since the waste that flows through this cascade is grossly
polluted (it includes heavy metals and even cholera) the first eco-system
is composed entirely of microorganisms - the only living things
capable of living in such filthy water. But further down the cascade we
get water plants and eventually vertebrates - carp, for instance. The
water that flows out of the final barrel easily passes the most stringent
drinking water standards, and the whole process is powered by sunlight
and gravity. Heavy metals are fixed, selectively, by various bacteria and
water plants which, of course, have to be harvested from time to time.
Once dried, these residues are sold to the metal recycling industry.
John Todd's revolutionary technology is certainly cleaner, and he, of
course, is convinced that it is also more efficient economically than the
conventional water treatment technology (so too are the venture
capitalists who are now backing him). But, even if it is better on both
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counts, there is no guarantee that it will drive out its well-established
competitor. For that to happen two conditions will have to be met.
" The new technology will have to be more efficient.
• Some actor will have to administer the "optimal
perturbation."
It is towards the effective institutionalisation of these two
conditions that the indicators of technological inflexibility (and, in
particular, my argument for seeing unsiteability as one of those
indicators) are directed.
Afterword
John Todd is very much committed to the egalitarian idea of
fairness. He wishes to see a less polarised and more caring world - one
in which we have all learned to "tread lightly on the earth." In
consequence, he is anxious about his living machines' involvement in the
marketplace. He fears that should his technology triumph, and sweep
away all our present water treatment technology in a Schumpeterian
"gale of destruction," people will feel able to carry on as before, relying
on the new technology to clean up the messes that he wishes them not
to be making in the first place. Hierarchists, too, would have less
justification for their regulatory interventions if people did what Todd
wants them to do and stopped making their messes, or if they didn't
and relied on his living machines to clean up their messes quickly and
cheaply.
In other words, re-focusing technology assessment on inflexibility
reduction does nothing towards deciding whose idea of fairness shall
prevail. But that, surely, is why we need it!
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